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NOTES
imposed upon them when dealing with a minor's property through a
fiduciary.
Federal tax consequences of gifts made pursuant to the Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act are generally favorable, or may potentially be made
so if prospective donors and custodians are properly advised. Transfers
made under the act are considered completed gifts of a present interest
and are entitled to the $3,000/$6,000 annual gift tax exclusion. Gifts
made by a donor who designates himself as custodian and dies befbre
the minor reaches twenty-one are includible in the decedent's gross estate
for federal estate tax purposes. This is a definite disadvantage in regard
to use of the custodianship device for estate planning purposes, but it
may be circumvented by having the donor appoint someone other than
himself as custodian. Income from gift property is taxable to the minor
child, except that any part of the income used by the custodian to dis-
charge a legal obligation of any person to support the child is taeable to
such a person. Generally parents will prefer that income be taxable to
the child to take advantage of income tax savings resulting from the
minor's exempt status or lower tax bracket. The custodian should be
warned, therefore, of the adverse tax consequences if income is expended
for the support of a minor who is the legal dependent of a higher
income-bracket taxpayer.16
THE EFFECT OF AN OMITTED SPECIAL FINDING OF FACT
In an action without a jury, when a proper motion for special find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law has been made, the court is required
by statute to find the ultimate facts, draw conclusions of law from them,
state the facts and conclusions separately, and enter judgment.'
Counsel for the winning party is generally requested to draft these
special findings of fact and conclusions of law. The judge then approves
them by his signature and enters judgment accordingly. However, on
appeal, the objection may be raised that some fact necessary to the ap-
pellee's case has been omitted from the special findings.
For seventy-eight years and in over one hundred cases, Indiana
courts have stated the rule that where a material fact has been omitted
166. Tax consequences, as discussed, are based on the current interpretation and
application of the tax code by the Commissioner and are subject, of course, to re-
evaluation and changes.
1. IND. ANN. STAT., § 2-2102 (1946).
273
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
from the special findings, that fact is presumed to have been found against
the party having the burden of proof of that fact below.2 If appellee had
the burden of proving the omitted fact, the appellate court may order the
trial court to set aside its conclusions of law and enter conclusions and
judgment in favor of appellant. Thus it is possible for the winning
party below to suffer an adverse final judgment because of what may
well have been mere oversight on the part of counsel and the judge.'
While such adverse final judgments are not frequently ordered by
the appellate court, the possibility still remains. The language of the In-
diana rule which calls for a presumption of error when a material fact
has been omitted from the special findings appears to be in direct con-
flict with the usual presumptions in support of the trial court's decision4
which are well founded in legal history and universal in application.5
HISTORICAL DERIVATION OF THE RULE
Practice under the special findings statute which was passed in
1852,6 was at first not well understood.' In Addleman v. Erwin, heard
2. The rule is stated in the recent case Fourts v. Largent, 228 Ind. 547, 552, 94
N.E.2d 448, 450 (1950), thus: "In the case of Graham v. State, 66 Ind. 386 (1879), the
rule which is applicable here seems to be well stated and is to the effect that when
special findings are requested and stated by the court, the findings so stated are those
that are proved upon the trial and none other, and where facts proved and found fail
to determine some of the issues those issues must be regarded as unproved by the party
having the burden of proof resting upon him."
3. See note 41 infra.
4. 2 GAVIT, INDIANA PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 436, p. 2372 (1942).
5. New York Cent. R. Co. v. Milhiser, 231 Ind. 180, 189, 106 N.E.2d 453 (1952);
Wisconsin Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Meixel, 221 Ind. 650, 654, 51 N.E.2d 78, 79 (1943);
Ferrard v. Genduso, 216 Ind. 346, 348, 24 N.E.2d 692, 693 (1940). The opposite pre-
sumption is recognized in few jurisdictions; its authority is vague and its application
inconsistent.
The only problem considered is that of the situation where the ultimate facts found
do not support the conclusions of law. Other similar questions frequently arise, but
these go to matters other than the sufficiency of the findings to support the conclu-
sions of law; such as the distinction between ultimate and evidentiary fact, Horn v.
Lupton, 182 Ind. 355, 106 N.E. 708 (1914) ; Coffinberry v. McClellan, 164 Ind. 131, 73
N.E. 97 (1905) ; Bartholomew v. Pierson, 112 Ind. 430, 14 N.E. 249 (1887); the dis-
tinction between question of law and question of fact, Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial
Review, 56 HARV. L. REV. 899 (1943) ; Phelps, What is a "Question of Law?" 18 U. OF
CINN. L. REV. 259 (1949) ; and the sufficiency of evidence to support the findings, De-
laney v. Gubbins, 181 Ind. 188, 104 N.E. 13 (1914) ; Wolverton v. Wolverton, 163 Ind.
26, 71 N.E. 123 (1904) ; Daily v. Smith, 66 Ind. App. 393, 118 N.E. 321 (1918).
6. IND. AcTs 1852 (R.S.), vol. 2, pt. II, c. 1, § 341, at 115. "Upon trials of ques-
tions of fact by the court, it shall not be necessary for the court to state its finding,
except generally, for the plaintiff or defendant, unless one of the parties request it, with
a view to excepting to the decision of the court upon the questions of law involved in the
trial in which case the court shall first state the facts in writing, and then the conclu-
sions of law-upon them, and judgment shall be entered accordingly."
7. In- Cruzon v. Smith, 41 Ind. 288, 293 (1872) the court stated that "... the
correct practice under Section 341 does not seem to be well understood by the profession
generally."
8. 6 Ind. 495 (1855).
274
NOTES
in 1855, the court advised appellant that under the new statute a motion
for special findings was lequired in order to assign error in the conclu-
sions of law on appeal. The special findings were necessary to allow the
appellate court to comprehend the reasoning of the trial court in order to
determine whether the conclusions of law were erroneous.
If a motion for special findings has been made, and the trial judge
fails to make a finding on a material fact, then the conclusions of law are
erroneous, since they are not supported by the facts found. However,
the Addlentan case, although it pointed out the necessity of the motion to
preserve the error for appeal, offered no indication of the proper method
of presenting the question of error in the conclusions of law to the ap-
pellate court.
It was first held that error in the conclusions of law should be as-
signed as independent error and that an appeal from the denial of a mo-
tion for a new trial, made on the grounds that the conclusions were con-
trary to law, did not properly present the question.' However, in 1872
the court in Cruzan v. Smith'0 held that although a motion for a new
trial would not directly present the question of the sufficiency of the
special findings to support the conclusions of law; appeal from the de-
nial of the motion might be perfected indirectly under Section 352" of
the code which provided for a new trial where, "... the verdict or de-
cision is not sustained by sufficient evidence, or is contrary to law."' 2
The court reviewed the evidence and reasoned that since the special find-
ings did not cover all the issues the trial court had applied the wrong
principle of law and hence had erred in denying the motion for a new
trial. The Cruzan case at least temporarily preserved the possibility of
indirectly reaching an omission in the special findings by a motion for
a new trial.
9. The Montmorency Gravel Road Co. v. Rock, 41 Ind. 263 (1872). The court
used as its major authority the cases of The City of Logansport v. Wright, 25 Ind. 512
(1865) and Luirance v. Luirance, 32 Ind. 198 (1869). In the Logansport case, appel-
lant did not except to the conclusions in any manner; but simply excepted to the denial
of his motion for a new trial. The court, citing Addleman v. Erwin, 6 Ind. 495 (1855)
held that no question as to the conclusions of law was properly presented. In the
Luirance case appellants made a motion for new trial on ground that the court had erred
in its findings and application of the law to the facts as found. The court, citing Addle-
ian Iv. Erwi, and the Logansport case, held that the proper method of presenting a
question under the statute on special findings was by simple exception to the conclusions
of law and not by motion for a new trial.
10. 41 Ind. 288 (1872).
11. IND. AcTs 1852 (R.S.) vol. 2, pt. II, c. 1, § 352, at 117.
12. Ibid.
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A further complicating factor, the common law motion for venire
de novo, was revived in Bosseker v. Cramer." It was said that, "A
venire de novo is granted when the verdict, . . . is imperfect by reason
of some uncertainty or ambiguity, or by finding less than the whole mat-
ter put in issue, or by not assessing damages."' 4 (Emphasis added.) By
1877 the above quoted rule had become, ". . . the well settled practice
in this state,"' 5 placing in Indiana law a motion which could cause a new
trial merely for failure of the trial court judge to find on a matter put
in issue, regardless of whether or not the conclusions of law were
erroneous.'
6
In 1879 the court in Anderson v. Donnell held that an omission of
a fact in a special finding was ground for a motion for venire de novo
and not for a motion for a new trial. This case expressly overruled the
Cruzan case' s which held that such an omission could be reached in-
directly by a motion for a new trial. The court determined that a motion
for a new trial reached a mistake in the special findings; but that a mo-
tion for a venire de novo reached an improper omission.
At this point the difficulty of distinguishing between a mistake and
an omission rendered the proper uses of the two motions extremely
vague. In addition, the range of errors reached by a motion for a new
trial was not known." Since a motion for venire de novo need not go
directly to the merits of the case it could upset decisions when there was
13. 18 Ind. 44 (1862). In this case the complaint alleged that defendant "un-
lawfully detained" certain property. The jury returned a verdict which read in part,
"unlawfully take and detain" (emphasis added) the said property. The court quoted at
P. 47 from 2 TIra's PRAcTiCE 922 the following. "A venire do novo is granted when the
verdict, whether general or special, is imperfect by reason of some uncertainty or am-
biguity, or by finding less than the whole matter put in issue, or by not assessing
damages." Clearly this court needed to be concerned only with "uncertainty," but the
case is used as authority for the whole quotation.
14. Id. at 47.
15. Whitworth v. Ballard, 56 Ind. 279 (1877).
16. Bosseker v. Cramer, 18 Ind. 44, 46 (1862) ; ELLIOTT, APPELLATE PROCEDURE §§
758-61 (1892); 2 GAVIT, INDIANA PLEADING AND PRACTICE (1942) § 2568; Rice, Pro-
posed Innovation in Civil Procedure, 21 TEMP. L. Q. 23 (1947).
17. 66 Ind. 150 (1879).
18. The case also purported specifically to overrule Schmitz v. Lauferty, 29 Ind.
400 (1868) which case really turned on the Statute of Frauds.
19. In the case of Montmorency Gravel Road Company v. Rock, 41 Ind. 263, 265
(1872) on petition for rehearing the court felt compelled to quote from the language
of the brief in order to be entirely fair. A portion of that quote demonstrates the con-
fusion. Counsel for appellant stated that "We are considerably surprised to learn that
we failed to assign these conclusions of law as error. We were under the impression
that when we assigned the wrongful overruling of our motion for a new trial, we
thereby covered our objections to the conclusions of law."
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no error in the conclusions of law, solely on the technical ground that
no finding had been made on a matter in issue.2"
FORMULATION OF THE RULE
In this confused state of affairs, due in great part to the tenacity of
venire de novo, the case of Graham v. the State ex rel the Board of Comm.
of Jefferson Co.2 arose. Plaintiff had alleged a number of breaches of
contract in his complaint. Appellant (defendant below) contended that
no findings were made on two of the alleged breaches; that since these
two breaches were put in issue by defendant's answer, the court had
failed to find on all the issues and a venire de novo should be granted.2
Apparently the findings of fact which had been made were sufficient to
support a recovery on any of a number of breaches other than these two.
To all appearances, the case had been decided correctly. If defendant's
argument that the judge had failed to perform his duty to find on every
fact in issue had been successful a venire de novo would have been re-
quired even though the defendant had in no way been prejudiced by the
failure of the trial court to find these facts.2"
The court began by stating that obviously only facts which have
been proved can be found; thus where no facts are proved in relation to
an issue such facts cannot be found. It then said, ". . . it would seem
that, the issues concerning which no facts are found should be regarded
as not proved by the party on whom the burden of the issue or issues
lies."24 (Emphasis added.)
The effect of the court's reasoning is that a failure of the trial court
to make a finding on a fact put in issue is not to be considered an omis-
20. This is not to say that a motion for venire de novo never did reach a sub-
stantial error; but rather that the error need not be necessarily substantial.
21. 66 Ind. 386 (1879).
22. See note 14 supra.
23. The defendant could not have excepted successfully to the conclusions of law
since the facts found did support the conclusions, nor could he have attacked the judg-
ment on the grounds that the findings were not supported by sufficient evidence, nor
that all the facts proved were not found.
The one way the judgment might be attacked successfully was through the motion
for a venire de novo which according to Bosseker Iv. Cramer could attack the form of
the judgment on the theory that the judge had a duty to find on every issue and a fail-
ure to do so was reversible error regardless of whether the conclusions of law them-
selves were sound.
It was important at common law that the verdict respond to every issue. ELLIoTT,
APPELLATE PROCEDURE (1892) § 758. Apparently there was no question of prejudicial
error.
24. Id. at 395. Although the court made no reference to the fact, the rule was
known at common law. SUNDERLAND, "MODERN PROCEDURAL DEvIcEs," in Field Cen-
tenary Essays 83, 94 (1949) ; Sunderland, Findings of Fact and Contclusions of Law in
Cases Where Juries are Waived, 4 U CiI. L. REv. 218, 226 (1937).
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sion. Instead, it is to be regarded as a finding adverse to the party bear-
ing the burden of the issue below. Thus there is no "omission," and a
motion for venire de novo cannot be granted since the judge's "duty"
has been performed.
The holding, limited to the facts of the case, is that an omitted find-
ing of fact will be regarded as a finding adverse to the party bearing the
burden of the issue below, where the presumption is consistent with the
trial court's decision.25 The judge will be presumed to have performed
this duty when such a presumption is not inconsistent with the trial
court's result.
The language of the case on the other hand indicated that the pre-
sumption could apply, regardless of whether it is consistent with the trial
court's decision.
Since the court was required to decide only whether the special find-
ings were objectionable because they did not pass on all the issues, the
reasoning of the court was largely unnecessary and the language of the
rule no more than dicta. The court could have construed the special
findings statute as abating the usual presumptions in support of the trial
court only where the findings of fact which had been made did not sup-
port the conclusions of law; and since here there was no exception to the
conclusions of law themselves, the appellate court could review the case
as though the findings were general and indulge all presumptions in favor
of the trial court without interfering with appellant's protection under
the statute.26
Although the motion for a venire de novo was not allowed to cause
reversal, the court's language set the stage for future misinterpretation.
In 1880, the year after the Graham case, the inherent danger of the
ambiguity of the rule became evident in Vavnoy v. Duprez.2 1 In the Van-
noy case, plaintiff had also won below. However, unlike the Graham case,
there was an omission of a material and necessary element of the plain-
25. See note 5 supra. The court's holding is consistent with the usual presumptions
in favor of the decision of the trial court. There was no clear evidence of an error
in the trial court's decision therefore the decision was affirmed.
26. If appellant had wished to appeal the case on its merits he should have made a
motion for a new trial on grounds of insufficient evidence and assigned as error that all
the facts proved were not found. Sterne v. McKinnery, 79 Ind. 577 (1881). Since
appellant did not bring up the evidence in an attempt to show that all the facts proved
were not found he had effectively waived any such objection.
27. The Graham case fairly abolished the motion for a venire de novo by removing
all possibility of omission, but the motion persisted where conclusions of law and find-
ings of fact were mixed, Kealing v. Vansickle, 74 Ind. 529 (1881) ; or where no con-
clusions of law could reasonably be drawn from the facts found, Locke v. The Mer-
chants National Bank, 66 Ind. 353 (1879). For discussion of the Graham case see Max-
well v. Wright, 160 Ind. 515, 67 N.E. 267 (1903).
28. 72 Ind. 26 (1880).
NOTES
tiff's case from the special findings; hence the facts found did not sup-
port the conclusions of law.29 Stating that the omission of one of the
material elements of appellee's cause of action must be regarded as an
adverse finding, the court was apparently prepared to administer the rule
strictly according to its terms and reverse and order final judgment for
the losing party below. The court's language indicated that the presump-
tion was conclusive even in the face of the trial court's decision for plain-
tiff; however, the court's final act was to order judgment entered for
the defendant "without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to prosecute
another action."3  Thus although the court could not affirm since the
material facts necessary to support the conclusions of law were not pres-
ent, still it was not prepared to hold the presumption conclusive as against
the trial court's decision. The decree had the effect of allowing a new
trial, if the plaintfif so desired, by abating the action of res judicata.
Therefore, the Vannoy case did not furnish authority for the literal ap-
plication of the rule.3
The theory indicated in the Vannoy case had begun to take more
definite form by 1886. In The Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown 2
the burden was on plaintiff below to show that he was the "sender" of
a telegraph message. Because that fact was not found as an ultimate
fact the court followed the language of the Graham rule and ordered the
trial court to change its conclusions of law and enter judgment in favor
of appellant. However, on petition for rehearing the court modified its
mandate by ordering the lower court to grant appellee a new trial if
requested.
In the later case of Buchanan v. Milligan,33 involving an appeal bond,
there was again an omission of a material fact from the special findings.
It was not stated in the finding that the bond which defendant had ex-
ecuted was the bond sued upon; nor were the terms and conditions of
the bond set forth. The Graham rule appeared to be applicable and it
29. Id. at 31. The court stated as the Graham rule, ". . . the special finding must
be deemed to embrace all the facts which were proved, and all issues not determined by
the facts found must be regarded as not proven by the party bearing the burden of
proof thereof."
30. Ibid.
31. Justices Biddle and Perkins were on the bench at the time the Graham case was
decided, and neither of them was on the bench when the Vanmwy case was decided.
Chief Justice Worden, who wrote the opinion in the Graham case, was on the bench at
the time the Vamnoy case was decided, but Justice Woods who wrote the opinion in the
Vannoy case was not on the bench when the Grahamn case was decided. The change in
the court's personnel affords some insight into the awkward application of the Graham
rule in the Vantwy case.
32. 108 Ind. 538, 8 N.E. 171 (1886).
33. 108 Ind. 433, 9 N.E. 385 (1886).
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might have been expected that the trial court would be ordered to restate
it§ conclusions of law in favor of appellant. Instead, the court recog-
nized the unfairness of this rule and went further than either the Vannoy
case or the Western Union case by ordering a new trial under Section
660, R.S. 1881 which provided that the Supreme Court "shall remand
the cause to the court below, with instructions for a new trial, when the
justice of the case requires it." This is the practice frequently followed
by appellate courts today. Where a material fact is omitted from the
special findings a new trial may be ordered at the discretion of the ap-
pellate court.
Later cases have extended the Graham rule to its ultimate limit. In
the case of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Bowser 4 the appel-
lee had been induced to purchase policies on the lives of several persons
by an agent of the insurance company who represented that the insured
parties need not sign them. When the insurance company later cancelled
the policies appellee requested the return of premiums paid. The trial
court allowed appellee to recover the premiums but failed to find that a
regulation existed which would cause a policy not signed by the insured
to be void ab initio rather than only voidable at the instance of one of
the parties. The appellate court held that a failure to find on this point
was a finding against the appellee on the issue and that judgment should
be reversed and entered in favor of appellant insurance company.
These cases illustrate four different applications of the rule. The
Graham case used the rule to uphold the decision of the trial court. The
Vannoy case, faced with the situation which called for an application of
the rule against the decision of the trial court, chose to allow the possi-
bility of a new trial. The Buchanan case ordered a new trial. The
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company case applied the rule literally and
allowed the presumption to operate conclusively against the trial court's
decision.
It certainly cannot be contended that on its facts the Graham case
furnishes authority for a rule which operates in some instances against
the decision of the trial court; however, this is the interpretation that
later courts have sometimes given it. 5 Nor can it be contended that the
Graham case provides an authoritative interpretation of the special find-
ings statute.36 In all probability the statute has never been construed
34. 20 Ind. App. 557, 50 N.E. 86 (1898).
35. See note 41 infra.
36. No case has been found which has construed the statute on special findings in
any other way than modified by the Graham rule.
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because of the readiness of the courts to apply or misapply the Graham
rule.
During the next twenty years, the rule was usually used, as in the
Graham case, to affirm the trial court's decision where sufficient find-
ings had been made to support the conclusions of law even though all
facts in issue were not found" or where the trial court had not found
specifically against an affirmative defense. "
Except for two cases3" during this period, when faced with the
apparent necessity of reversing, and entering- judgment for the losing
party below, the courts took their cue from the Buchanan case and re-
sorted to their statutory powers to grant a new trial where "the justice
of the case requires it."
40
MODERN PRACTICE
Since 190041 there have been several more cases where the appellate
court has followed the language of the Graham rule strictly and ordered
37. App v. Class, 225 Ind. 387, 75 N.E.2d 543 (1947); Shilling v. Parsons, 110
Ind. App. 52, 36 N.E.2d 958 (1941) ; Wiard v. Landes, 80 Ind. App. 551, 141 N.E. 519
(1923).
38. Indiana State Toll-Bridge Commissioner v. Minor, 132 N.E.2d 282 (Ind. 1956);
McCoy v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Indiana, 123 Ind. App. 424, 111 N.E.2d 728
(1953) ; Boyer v. Leas, 116 Ind. App. 502, 64 N.E.2d 38, 116 Ind. App. 502, 64 N.E.2d
591 (1946).
39. Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis & Chicago R.R. Co. v. Gaines, 104 Ind. 526,
4 N.E. 34 (1885) ; The Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Bowser, 20 Ind. App. 557, 50
N.E. 86 (1898).
40. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3234 (1946).
41. Another line of cases developed along a collateral point before 1900. Kealing v.
Vansickle, 74 Ind. 529 (1881) held that where the conclusions of law included matters
which should have been found as fact, the finding was imperfect and a venire de novo
should be granted. In the case of Jarvis v. Banta, 83 Ind. 528, (1882) the court appears
to follow the Kealing case by holding a finding defective because of an omission. The
rule crystallized in the case of Braden v. Lennon, 127 Ind. 9, 26 N.E. 476 (1890). In
that case there was a question of payment. There were strong evidentiary facts found
which indicated payment, but there was no ultimate fact of payment found, rather, pay-
ment was found as a conclusion of law. The court followed the Kealing and Jarvis
cases and held that a new trial must be ordered.
Apparently the rule that conclusions of law will not aid the findings of fact, and
findings of fact will not aid the conclusions of law is not questioned today. Kerfoot v.
Kessner, 222 Ind. 58, 84 N.E.2d 190 (1949). It is difficult to see any justification for
the rule where the judge sits as trier of fact. There is justification where the jury
determines questions of fact and the judge makes conclusions of law. In that case the
jury should not make conclusions of law and the judge should not supply findings of
fact because these functions are without their respective provinces. In the case of spe-
cial findings, the judge finds both fact and law. Any distinction between the two in
that situation must be, at most, a formal distinction. Certainly a finding of fact in-
cluded within the conclusions of law should not be more than an error in form and as
such, not a reversible error.
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judgment against the winning party below.42 In general, however, the
courts have ordered a new trial.4 " A significant addition to the alterna-
tives available to the court arose in the form of an attempt by the ap-
pellate courts, in some cases, to amend the findings rather than ordering
a new trial.44
42. Where plaintiff sought to enjoin issuance of certain stock and plaintiff had
burden of proof on issue of fraud and there was no finding of fraud it was held that
the failure of the trial court to find fraud was a finding that there was no fraud. The
trial court's decision was reversed and trial court was ordered to enter judgment for
defendant. Wabash Valley Coach Co. v. Turner, 221 Ind. 52, 46 N.E.2d 212 (1943).
Where employee sued to recover wages under a bonus agreement and trial court allowed
recovery; the Supreme Court reversed and ordered trial court to restate its conclusions
of law consistent with Supreme Court's opinion because plaintiff below had burden of
proof on issue of the employer's breach and the trial court did not find on the issue
of the breach. Home Equipment Co. v. Gorham, 218 Ind. 454, 33 N.E.2d 99 (1941).
In Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 168 Ind. 390, 81 N.E. 79 (1906), plaintiff was
sued for injury done to certain farm animals by defendant's railroad train. Trial court
awarded judgment to plaintiff but failed to find that animals entered tracks at place
where railroad was bound to fence; nor did the trial court find facts sufficient to
warrant a conclusion of negligence as a matter of law. The trial court was ordered to
render judgment for defendant. Where real estate broker sought to collect commis-
sion on sale of house and trial court found against the claim, the appellate court re-
versed and ordered judgment for plaintiff below because there was no finding that the
commission arrangement had been terminated and the burden of that issue was on the
defendant below. Home Development Co. v. Arthur Jordan Land Co., 100 Ind. App.
458, 196 N.E. 337 (1935). In Kratli v. Booth, 99 Ind. App. 178, 191 N.E. 180 (1934),
the burden was on appellee to show that appellant's signature was not procured by
fraud. There was no finding on the issue therefore the appellate court reversed the trial
court's decision and ordered trial court to restate its conclusions in harmony with the
appellate court's opinion. In Abden v. Wallace, 95 Ind. App. 604, 165 N.E. 68 (1932),
where one of the conclusions of law was based on a defense presented in appellee's
answer, failure of the court to find on that issue was regarded as a finding against the
appellee and the trial court's decison was reversed with order to restate conclusions of
law in favor of appellant and render judgment accordingly. Likewise in Michigan
Commercial Ins. Co. of Lansing v. Wills, 57 Ind. App. 256, 106 N.E. 725 (1914), where
trial court found that auto had been taken unlawfully from plaintiff's garage and
wrecked some miles distant but failed to find that the auto was "stolen," appellate court
held that the failure to find was a finding that the auto was not stolen and reversed
he trial court's decision.
43. The general argument is well stated in Buchanan v. Milligan, 108 Ind. 433,
434, 9 N.E. 385 (1886). After determining that the decision of the trial court could
not be sustained, the court said, "There are cases where it is evident from the face of
the record that injustice would result from directing a judgment on the special find-
ings, and in such cases, we think it is not only within our power, but that it is our
duty, not to direct judgment upon the facts contained in the special finding, but to
remand the case for new trial.
Accord, Donaldson v. State, 167 Ind. 553, 78 N.E. 182 (1906) ; Coffinberry v.
McClellan, 164 Ind. 131, 73 N.E. 97 (1905) ; Automobile Underwriters v. Tite, 119 Ind.
App. 251, 85 N.E.2d 365 (1949); Sheets v. Stiefel, 117 Ind. App. 584, 74 N.E.2d 921
(1947); Burkhart v. Simms, 115 Ind. App. 576, 60 N.E.2d 141 (1945); Daugherty v.
Daugherty, 115 Ind. App. 253, 57 N.E.2d 599 (1944); Neu v. Woods, 103 Ind. App.
342, 7 N.E.2d 531 (1937) ; Union Ins. Co. of Indiana v. Glover, 100 Ind. App. 327, 195
N.E. 583 (1935); Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. Martinsville Harness Co., 74 Ind. App. 14,
128 N.E. 616 (1920) ; Malon v. Scholler, 48 Ind. App. 691, 96 N.E. 499 (1911).
44. The landmark case is Marion Trust Co. v. Bennett, 169 Ind. 346, 359, 82 N.E.
782, 787 (1907). The court said, ". . . and it is true that we have no power, generally
speaking, to add to a special finding. We may, however, give heed to a fact appearing
NOTES
It is argued that the appellate court may do what the trial court
should have done. Since the denial of the motion for a new trial by the
trial court without considering an amendment of the findings is error.;
and since the trial court is bound to correct the error and does not; then
the appellate court should do so."'
Although there can be no doubt that such power exists by statute"
and that amendment by the appellate court offers a simple solution for
avoiding the burden of a new trial, the question of whether the appellate
court should amend the findings of fact is still open to dispute.4
The misunderstanding and misapplication of the Graham rule has
required the appellate court to attempt the impossible task of curing "tech-
nical" defects while at the same time avoiding the fact finding function
reserved to trial courts. Manifestly, no distinct separation can be drawn
between technical defects and finding facts. Unless arguments in favor
of appellate fact finding are to be accepted, the appellate fact finding that
may occur in a hard case is a usurpation of the trial court's function by
the appellate court with resulting harmful precedent. It is true that
courts of equity reviewed the evidence on appeal and that courts of law,
in the evidence which does not admit of dispute, in order to uphold the judgment." The
court used as authority Dyke v. Spargur, 143 N.Y. 651, 38 N.E. 269 (1894) and Sturgeon
v. Hull, 8 Ohio C.C. Dec. 269 (1894), and argued that such omission is a formal error
of the type which the statute provided should be deemed amended in the Supreme Court.
In Judah v. Cheyne, 53 Ind. App. 476, 483, 101 N.E. 1039, 1042 (1913), the court
modified the Graham rule by saying, "It must be remembered, however, in this con-
nection that where the primary facts found lead to but one conclusion, or where facts
found are of such a character that they necessitate the inference of' an ultimate fact,
such ultimate fact will be inferred and treated as found. Mayer v. C. P. Lesh Paper
Co., 45 Ind. App. 250, 89 N.E. 894, 45 Ind. App. 250, 90 N.E. 651 (1910); Indiana
Trust Co. v. Byram, 36 Ind. App. 6, 72 N.E. 670, 36 Ind. App. 6, 73 N.E. 1094 (1905);
Depaw Plate Glass Co. v. City of Alexandria, 152 Ind. 442, 52 N.E. 608."
The court then reviewed the findings and stated that, "Under such a finding of
facts it would be a legal absurdity to hold that the judgment of the trial court should
be reversed because such court did not in express words find the ultimate fact of present
ownership of real estate in question." Ibid.
This theory has been followed generally in the following cases and in the cases
cited therein. -Kelly, Glover & Vale v..Heitman, 220 Ind. 625, 44 N.E.2d 981 (1942) ;
Scott v. Kell, 134 N.F_.2d 828 (Ind. App. 1956) ; Smith v. Smith, 124 Ind. App. 618, 116
N.E.2d 548 (1953) ; Cooper v. Tarpley, 112 Ind. App. 1, 41 N.E.2d 640 (1942) ; Garrett
v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 111 Ind. App. 515, 38 N.E.2d 874 (1942) ; Colonial
Fire Underwriters of National Fire Ins. Co. v. German, 108 Ind. App. 601, 31 N.E.2d
68 (1941) ; Sputh v. Francisco State Bank, 105 Ind. App. 149, 13 N.E.2d 880 (1937) ;
Lindley v. Seward, 103 Ind. App. 600, 5 N.E.2d 998 (1937) ; Afferican Income Ins. Co.
v. Kindlesparker, 102 Ind. App. 445, 200 N.E. 432 (1936).
45. 2 GAviT, INDIANA PLEADING AND PRACTICE, § 436 (1942).
46. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3229 (1946).
47. Note, 8 IND. L. J. 195 (1932) ; Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Fact,
4 U. CHI. L. REv. 190, 207 (1937) ; Cohen, Reluctance of the -New York Court of Ap-
peals to Review Findinlgs of Fact, 49 COLUm. L. REv. 352 (1944) ; Orfield, Appellate
Procedure in Equity Cases; A Guide for Appeals at Law, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 563, 594
(1942) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 52; 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE § 52.06 [2].
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in trial without jury, now have the same power by statute; but, when
courts of equity tried de novo on appeal, all the evidence was documen-
tary.48 When oral testimony is involved the appellate courts are not in
equal position with the trial court in passing on the credibility of wit-
nesses.49 For this reason the power granted to law courts is virtually
academic. Although the appellate courts in cases at law now have the
same power as in cases in equity, even in a case in equity an appellate
court could not sit as finder of fact except where the evidence in ques-
tion is documentary.50
Amendment also negatives the intent of the special findings statute.
It would be of little effect to have a statute requiring special findings
and conclusions of law in order to protect the litigants from arbitrary
action by the trial court if the appellate court is free to indulge whole-
sale presumptions which cure all defects in the findings and conclusions."
Clearly the present alternatives available to the appellate courts are
not adequate. A mandate of judgment against the winning party below
produces a monstrous result; likewise, ordering a new trial may place
an unnecessary burden upon an appellee who has won properly on the
merits. The act of amending findings in the appellate court conflicts
with the fundamental division between trial and appellate courts.
Another choice has been given the courts by new Supreme Court
Rule 2-30"2 effective January 1, 1958. The new rule presently allows
the appellate courts to amend where there is undisputed evidence support-
ing the fact omitted. This aspect is not new since the undisputed evi-
dence indicated must probably still be documentary; however, the rule
alternatively allows the appellate court to remand the case to the trial
48. Orfield, op. cit. supra note 47 at 563.
49. Ibid. Pigg v. Cook, 123 Ind. App. 414, 109 N.E.2d 107 (1952).
50. See notes 45, 46 and 47 supra. In the case of Gilchrist v. Gilchrist, 225 Ind.
367, 75 N.E.2d 417 (1947) appellant called attention to IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3229 (1946)
which states that on appeal in non-jury cases the court shall weigh the evidence and if
it appears that the judgment is not fairly supported by or is contrary to the weight of
the evidence, shall award judgment accordingly. The court answered that the statute
does not require the appellate court to weigh conflicting evidence. Appellant argued
that the evidence was uncontradicted and hence without conflict. The court did not
agree that it necessarily followed that conflicting inferences might not be drawn from
uncontradicted evidence.
51. If the finding is general, all presumptions are indulged in favor of the decision
of the trial court. If the same presumptions are to be used when the findings are
special then the effect is to make the special findings general. As a practical matter, a
motion for special findings would be of no effect.
52. IND. SUPREME CT. RULE 2-30 "Special Findings of Fact on Appeal. When
special findings of fact are made in an action tried by the court without a jury and the
court fails to find on some material issue of fact, on appeal from the judgment the re-
viewing court may either affirm the judgment if it is supported by undisputed evidence,




court for further findings. Although an important change for the bet-
ter,5 3 the rule might be more effective were provision made for a motion
to amend special findings in the trial court before appeal. Under Su-
preme Court Rule 1-8"' the possibility of amendment by the trial court is
presented, but there is no motion by which the winning party, upon
discovering an omission in the findings, may direct the court's attention
specifically to the findings themselves and request that the trial court
amend them to cure the error. A motion to amend in the trial court
would give the winning party the opportunity to cure omissions in the
findings after judgment and would afford all necessary protection against
the burden of a new trial. If such a motion were made in the trial court,
the appellate court might, upon observing that a material fact has been
omitted from the special findings, remand the case to the trial court for
reconsideration of the motion to amend. 5 If the omitted fact had been
proved at the trial court and the same judge was on the bench, the trial
court could amend and the case would be at an end. If the fact had -not
been proved at the trial court, the judge who had heard the case was no
longer on the bench or for some other reason the trial court chose not to
amend, the motion for a new trial could be granted. Under such pro-
cedure the winning party would have maximum protection against the
unnecessary burden of a new trial, the practice would be simplified and
appeals on technical errors would diminish.5
53. The new rule gives the appellate courts the opportunity to remand the case to
the trial court for competent fact finding without the burden of a new trial. Without
resort to amendment of the findings, this may be the only just disposition of cases
where there has been an omission of a material fact from the special findings.
54. IND. SUPREME CT. RuLE 1-8 "Power of Court in Cases Tried Without a jury.
On a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the
judgment, if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law, or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a
new judgment."
55. Remanding the case for further findings is not altogether new to Indiana as it
has been practiced as early as 1944 in review of decisions of Industrial Boards. See
Cole v. Sheehan Construction Co., 222 Ind. 274, 281, 53 N.E.2d 172, 175 (1944) where
the court states that, '"We think, therefore, that it was an invasion of the province of
the full Board for the Appellate Court to undertake to find the ultimate facts in the first
instance. The statute does not contemplate that the functions of the Industrial Board
may be assumed by the courts. The better practice would appear to be to remand the
proceeding to the Board with directions for it to discharge its statutory duty by finding
the essential facts, and by entering an award based thereon. When that has been done
any party feeling aggrieved may have a judicial review according to the established
practice."
56. For a different solution of the problem see Hyde, A Modern Substitute for
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 32 A.B.A.J. 131 (1946). For collected cases
see Annot., 76 A.L.R. 1137 (1932).
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CONCLUSION
The statute on special findings should be allowed to operate so as to
insure that cases will be determined according to the law and the evi-
dence. The only question presented by exception to the conclusions of
law should be whether the facts found are sufficient to support the con-
clusions of law. In order to carry out the intent of the statute, the usual
presumptions in favor of the trial court should not apply when the appel-
late court is considering the sufficiency of the facts found to support the
conclusions of law. A suspension of the usual presumptions in support
of the trial court is not the same as a presumption against the trial court;
but rather, indicates that the facts found must support the conclusions of
law and that blanket presumptions should not be used to supply omitted
facts.
The Graham rule, holding that an omitted finding of fact must be
regarded as a finding adverse to the party bearing the burden of proof
below, is unfounded when applied against the trial court's decision and
unnecessary when applied to support it.
Further changes are needed in the practice under the statute author-
izing special findings. A motion for special findings should be granted
at any time before final judgment. Provision should be made for a mo-
tion to amend specal findings, after judgment and before an appeal is
taken. Where the appellate court determines that the facts found are not
sufficient to support the conclusions of law, whenever possible the case
should be remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of the motion
to amend the special findings."
Of course such procedure would not preclude the appellate courts'
exercise of their power to order a new trial in cases where "the justice
of the case requires it."
Nor should the procedure preclude the appellate courts from remand-
ing a case for further findings where there has been no motion to amend.
The motion to amend is simply a device to direct the court's attention to
the amendment power granted under Supreme Court Rule 1-8."8 The
motion to amend should give the winning party below every opportunity
to avoid the burden of a new trial where a new trial is not absolutely
necessary.
Under this suggested practice a new trial would not be required
unless necessary to determine the issues on the findings of fact which
57. If there was ever any doubt that the appellate courts had the power to remand
a case for further findings such doubts have been resolved by SUPREME COURT RULE
2-30 which rule expressly authorizes the procedure.
58. See note 54, supra.
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were omitted. All possibility of a mandate of judgment against the win-
ning party below because of a technical omission would be removed and
there would no longer be any necessity for the appellate court to amend
special findings.
